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I Introduction
I.i The Formality of The Investigation of F
in Plato's Dramas of Definition
Several Platonic texts share a similar structure: at some point in the discussion a 
question is posed of the form, What is FI, where F  is, in the broadest sense, an αρετή.1 
The remainder of the discussion is devoted to determining the identity of this entity.
These texts include Charmides, Laches, Euthyphro, and Hippias Major. Investigations of 
F  also occur in Meno and Republic I, but to a more limited extent. After the What-is-F? 
question is posed, only a portion of the remaining discussion is devoted to answering it. 
At some point other questions arise and pursuit of the What-is-F? question is suspended. 
Sections of Protagoras are also devoted to the pursuit of the identity of άρεταί. In Lysis a 
What-is-F? question is never posed. However, there are grounds for maintaining that the 
majority of the discussion attempts to determine what ό φίλος or φιλία, is.2 In each case, 
the text ends with the investigation of F  unresolved. I refer to these four and related four 
texts as dramas of definition.3
While the investigations in the dramas of definition are similar in the sense 
described as well as in other conspicuous ways, each investigation is also conspicuously 
idiosyncratic. Types of idiosyncrasy include the way Socrates poses questions, the kind 
of responses his interlocutors give, and the way Socrates criticizes his interlocutors' 
responses. There must be numerous reasons for these idiosyncrasies; but perhaps the 
most obvious is this: in each text the identity of a different άρετή is investigated. To 
some extent then the form of the investigations is άρετή-speciñc. That is to say, the form 
of a given investigation depends to some extent on the specific άρετή investigated.
1 In all these texts, but one some human άρετή investigated. In Meno it is human άρετή itself. But in 
Hippias Major it is broader, since Socrates and Hippias consider the κάλλος o f humans as w ell as non­
human entities. LSJ correctly give "excellence" as the primary definition o f "άρετή". Herodotus writes o f 
the άρετή of land (4.198). Plato writes of the άρετή o í equipment (601d). In Republic I  human άρετή is 
distinguished from the άρετή o f dogs and horses.
2 Though see David Sedley's "Is the Lysis a Dialogue o f Definition?'', Phronesis 34 (1989).
3 Protagoras really should not be called a "drama of definition", aside from convenience in terms o f its role 
in this paper. A lso, in this paper I do not discuss Lysis.
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Aside from ά ρ ετ7-specificity, a given investigation may be composed in certain 
idiosyncratic ways for any number of other reasons. These I refer to under the broad 
category of drama-specificity41 will speak then of άρετή- or drama-specific 
characteristics and structures of a text. I use the words "characteristic" and "structure" 
informally, under the assumption that pre-analytic intuitions are clear enough to serve the 
needs of the paper. Whatever the precise identity-conditions for a characteristic are, 
"structure" is used to designate a complex of interrelated characteristics.5
The existence of αρετή- and drama-specific elements (i.e., characteristics and 
structures) in a text presumes the existence of αρετή- and drama-specific characteristic 
and structural principles. Characteristic and structure are descriptive categories; principle 
is an explanatory one. So, an άρετή-specific or drama-specific characteristic or structural 
principle is a proposition or set of propositions that explains the occurrence of an άρετή- 
specific or drama-specific characteristic or structure in the text. For instance, where C is 
an aper/j-specific characteristic of text T, and P is the pertinent ά ρετf-specific 
characteristic principle, C occurs in Fbecause of P .6
Assuming some influence of άρετή-specificity and drama-specificity on the 
formation of the investigations, it is a question to what extent, if any, formal elements 
relating to the investigation of F  characterize the texts as well. By formal elements I 
mean both characteristics and structures of the investigation of F  whose occurrence is due 
to formal characteristic and structural principles. These formal principles are propositions 
about the investigation of F  generally, such as that F  is an entity of a certain kind. For 
instance, both άι/δρεία.investigated in Laches and σωφροσύνη investigated in Charmides 
are άρεταί. If Socrates appealed to F  being ah άρετή in order to refute a definition of his
4 For instance, the epistemological discussion in Meno does not seem to be due to ¿pfr^-specific reasons.
5 For instance, an investigation may be regarded as having the following structure: Socrates asks his 
interlocutor a question o f the form, What-is-F?; the interlocutor offers an account o f F?; Socrates rejects 
this account; the interlocutor offers a second account; Socrates rejects this account; and so on, until, after a 
number of rejected accounts, Socrates' initial interlocutor desists from the investigation, and a second 
interlocutor takes his place.
6 For instance, the characteristic principle explaining the characteristic that an investigation ends in aporia 
might be the fact that the author did not know the answer to the question Socrates poses. Similarly, the 
structural principle explaining the structure described in footnote four might be that Plato wished initially to 
canvass a range o f popular beliefs about the moral entity under investigation and to impress upon his 
intended audience the inadequacies of these popular beliefs.
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interlocutor, this characteristic of the investigation would be formal; and the principle 
explaining its existence would be formal.7
Many scholars believe the investigations in Plato's dramas of definition are to 
some extent governed by certain formal principles. For example, those who believe F  is 
an είδος might consent that, from whatever point the investigation begins, Socrates (as 
Platonic pedagogue) encourages the investigation toward a view of F  as an είδος. 
Similarly, those who believe the άρεταί are identical or, if not identical, mutually 
entailing, e.g., types of σοφία, might consent that Socrates encourages the investigation 
toward an intellectualist view of αρετή.
In this paper I consider which formal characteristics, if any, occur in the 
investigations. In addition, I am interested in whether there is a transformation of formal 
characteristics among the dramas of definition.
Methodologically, the paper focuses on what I call the surface claims and 
arguments of the text. By that I mean the explicit claims and arguments Socrates and his 
interlocutors make about the identity of F. This aspect of the texts is distinguished from 
their literary or dramatic aspects as well as any indirect claims and arguments about F, 
however these might occur. The neglect of the literary and dramatic dimensions of the 
texts seems to me irresponsible as a general hermeneutic principle, but I do not see that it 
jeopardizes this particular project.
In addition, I make some reference to the inconspicuous discursive conditions of 
early fourth century Athens and the Greek world at large. Plato assumes much in his 
writings that would have been familiar to his intended audience of fourth century Greeks. 
Especially in considering aperrç-specificity in the dramas of definition, it is advisable to 
be sensitive to these discursive conditions.
7 The following is a negative example. It is possible, though highly unlikely, that ending in aporia is not a 
formal characteristic o f all the investigations. It could be a drama-specific one, i.e., one that occurs in all 
the texts, but in each case for reasons particular to that text and unrelated to the reasons for aporia in other 
texts. In such cases we would speak o f drama-specific characteristics or structures and drama-specific 
characteristic or structural principles.
3
Lii The Argument of the Paper8
The paper suggests that certain formal characteristics of the investigations of F in  
the dramas of definition transform between one set of texts and another. I refer to these 
two sets as A and B. Set A consists of Republic I, Charmides, Laches, and Protagoras. 
Set B consists of Euthyphro, Hippias Major, and Meno.
Among A F  is an άρβτή. F  is characterized as a psychic δύυαμις, and more 
specifically as a certain σοφία. F is  never characterized as an eiôoç/tôéa.or as an ουσία.9 
The range of/entities is limited to people and their actions. 10 F is  characterized as 
dynamically related to /action. By this is meant that /  action (or action performed /  ly) is 
the έργου of F, which is its δύυαμις. The relation of F  to/people is vague. The relation 
has been described as constitutive, but the metaphysics of constitution do not seem to me 
simple or obvious. So, I prefer to refer to this relation as psychic, and I analyze it in the 
following vague way: if F  is in the ψυχή of S, then S  i s /
Among B F is  characterized as an βΐδος! ιδέα.and an ούσία; never in Euthyphro or 
Hippias Major as a psychic entity, an epistemic state, or a δύυαμις; and only in the later 
stages of Meno as an epistemic state. Attending the transformation in A and B is a 
transformation in the characterization of the relation between F  and/ entities. In Hippias 
Major, the range of f  entities is broader than people and their actions; it includes artifacts 
and inanimate natural kinds. Since some/entities are not actions and some are inanimate, 
the relation between them and F  cannot be described as dynamic or psychic. Moreover, 
since F  is not explicitly conceived as a psychic-entity or a δύυαμις, a psychic or dynamic 
explanation of the relation is unwarranted.
In both Euthyphro and Hippias Major, the following phrase-type occurs: all/
8 A word on the genesis o f the paper—the argument of the paper develops from my experience with the 
interpretation o f Euthyphro. I found the investigation o f F  in Euthyphro puzzling in comparison with those 
in Republic I, Charmides, and Laches. Having failed to explain the relative idiosyncrasies o f Euthyphro on 
ripéTrç-specific grounds, I developed an alternative hypothesis. I found that my hypothesis for the 
distinctiveness o f the investigation of F in  Euthyphro explains aspects of the investigations in Hippias 
Major and Meno.
9 In Protagoras and Charmides F is  recognized as having an ούσία, however, the investigation o f F is  not 
conceived as the pursuit of an ούσία.
10 Throughout the paper I use the symbol /fo r  the adjective corresponding to F.
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entities are /because of F  This phrase-type seems to suggest that the relation between F  
and/entities is the same in the case of every/entity. But this can only be true if this 
relation is understood as different from the dynamic and psychic relation. It is suggested 
that F is related to /  entities by an ousiac relation. The nature of the ousiac relation is 
vague; and it is suggested that it may rest on a confusion of logical, constitutive, and 
causal relations.
Finally, an appendix discusses the use of the το- f  phrase for F  (in particular, in 
Euthyphro). The rô-/phrase is ambiguous and can be used as a referring expression or as 
a quantifier-phrase. Its use as a referring expression, specifically to denote F, occurs in A 
in Protagoras and Republic I, but not in Laches and Charmides. Moreover, in Protagoras 
the form "τό όσων" does not occur, only "άσωτης". It is hypothesized that the το- f 
phrase is introduced as a Form-designation in the later dramas, in particular in Euthyphro, 
in order to distinguish the novel metaphysical conceptualization of F  from popular 
conceptions of F  evoked by common grammatical forms of F
The argument for distinctiveness between A and B raises the question whether the 
transformation of certain formal characteristics in the investigation of F  reflects a 
development in Plato's thought or rather the pedagogical order in which the writings were 
intended to be read. If the paper were arguing that the two characterizations are exclusive, 
it would be appropriate to argue for developmentalism. Since the paper does not argue 
this, but only that the characterizations are distinct, it would be necessary to add another 
dimension to the paper in order to resolve the question. Since the paper is already quite 
long, this question is not addressed here; and the argument remains compatible with both 
developmentalism and unitarianism.
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II A
n.i The Άρετή-Σαφία  Thesis in A
In this section of the paper I suggest that the investigations of F in  A (i.e., 
Republic I, Charmides, Laches, and Protagoras) share several formal characteristics. 
These include the characterization of F  as psychic, an epistemic state, and a δύναμις. 
These claims are generally accepted;11 but it is important that I defend them because in 
the following third section of the paper I suggest that the investigations of F in  other 
dramas of definition, B (i.e, Euthyphro, Hippias Major, and Meno) do not exhibit these 
formal characteristics. Scholars who argue for the first claim do not argue for the second; 
and, as far as I know, to argue for both claims is novel.
It is also important how I argue for the first claim. I want to show that the texts of 
A share certain formal characteristics despite the various forms o f the investigation o f F  
in the individual texts. In order to reconcile diversity of form with what may be called a 
certain conceptual unity, I introduce the concept of άρετ77-specificity and make 
arguments on άρετή-specific grounds.
To begin—I suggest that in the investigations in A the persona Socrates is 
committed to the belief that αρετή (or at least the specific άρετή under investigation) is a 
psychic entity and more specifically an epistemic state. In Laches and Republic I  h t says 
and argues that αρετή is a certain σοφία. In Protagoras he argues that all the άρεταί are 
a form (or forms) of σοφία. In Charmides Socrates does not explicitly say or argue that 
σωφροσύνη is a kind of σοφία. But he does suggest that σωφροσύνη is a psychic entity, 
that it is beneficial, and that one who does good, cannot be σώφρων without knowing 
what he is doing. These claims suggest that σωφροσύνη at least requires σοφία', and the 
central section of the investigation discusses definitions of σωφροσύνη as επιστήμη. I 
believe the άρετή-σοφία. thesis is a structural principle of A. That is to say, I believe that
11 For example, Penner, Terry, "The Unity o f Virtue", Philosophical Review 82 (1973) 35-68; Bumyeat, 
M iles F., "Virtues in Action", The Philosophy o f Socrates, ed. Gregory Vlastos, 209-34; Teloh, Henry, The 
Development o f Plato's Metaphysics, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1981, esp. 18-45; Irwin, 
Terence, Plato's Ethics, Oxford University Press, 1995.
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in A Plato intends to encourage consideration of the thesis that αρετή is a certain σοφία-, 
and he organizes the investigations in accordance with this thesis.
I have said that in A Socrates believes F is  psychic entity or an epistemic state. I 
have not said that Socrates believes F is  a psychic-type or a type of epistemic state. I 
want the distinction to be clear. The former might suggest the latter to contemporary 
philosophers. But the type-token distinction or something akin to it is simply not 
articulated or discussed in A.
Consider, for instance, the sentence "άρετη is in the ψυχή". In this sentence, what 
exactly is the relation between άρετή and the ψυχή! In order to answer the question we 
must consider whether "ψυχή" and "άνδρεία" are recognized as general as opposed to 
singular terms. Clearly in A ψυχαί are regarded as individuated. But it is not clear 
whether άνδρείαι are, like tropes or simply like particulars, individuated as well; or 
whether άνδρεία is, like a universal, a unity somehow present in multiple ψυχαί. In 
almost all dramas of definition the moral entity under investigation is suggested to be a 
single ov or πράγμα. Taking "aura" and "πράγματα" as synonyms, we may translate 
these terms as "entities".12 Though, it is unclear exactly how broad a range of entities 
were considered πράγματα, and οντα.13
In Laches it is said that all άνδρεΐοι men possess άνδρεία. But there is no 
indication that thought is given to the question whether each άνδρείος has his own 
άνδρεία, or whether there is just one; or how this is related to the unity of the πράγμα. In 
considering such questions ourselves we are consciously approaching familiar 
metaphysical problems relating to the identity of properties and their relation to 
particulars. But, these questions are not raised in A. Consequently, I do not describe 
Socrates as seeking types or Forms in A.
Instead, Socrates' interest in the άρεταί seems to be principally in two claims 
about these entities. We have already mentioned the one: the άρεταί are psychic entities; 
i.e., they exist in the ψυχαί of humans. More specifically, they are a certain σοφία. The
12 This point is discussed further in section three.
13 Some insight into this question may be gained from considering passages 292c9-d3 and 294b 1 from 
Hippias Major in conjunction. In the former Socrates lists a wide variety o f /cold.entities, including acts, 
processes, humans, gods, and natural kinds; in the latter he says that all καλά, πράγματα.are καλά.αα. 
account o f τό καλόν. If " πράγματα" in this latter passage is understood to include the range of entities 
listed in the former passage, then "πράγμα" may be an all-purpose word for any entity.
7
Socratic belief about the psychic nature of the aperai  contrasts with the belief, initially 
expressed by all of Socrates' interlocutors, that the âperai are actions.14 The second claim 
is that the âperai endow their possessors with the capacity (δύναμις) to perform acts f- ly 
and make their possessors/  Note the distinction in these two claims between the relation 
of F  and an/ action and F  and an / person. In the former case the relation appears to be 
causal; in the latter constitutive. It is controversial how Plato understands these relations; 
and, more broadly, how he distinguishes causal, constitutive, and logical relations. These 
problems are discussed both in this section and the following third section.
In sum, in A F is  understood to have the following characteristics. Though, again, 
note that an ontological distinction between substance and attribute cannot be assumed 
and is not explicitly recognized. F is  a positive moral entity; accordingly, it is conceived 
as possessing positive moral characteristics such as being-άγαθόν, being-zeaAoi', being- 
ώφέλιμαν, etc., as well as being/(i.e., self-predicable).15 It is a psychic entity; that is to 
say, something that exists in the φνχή. It is a certain epistemic state;16 that is, a certain 
σοφία.{also described as έπιστήμη  and φρονήσις, and sometimes, more specifically, as 
the knowledge of good and evil). F  is also a δύναμις. Finally, I stress that in A F  is not 
described as a universal or Form.
Π.Μ The First Definitions in Republic /  and Charmides
The first definition of δικαιοσύνη in Republic Fis an action,17 telling the truth and 
returning what one takes. Socrates refutes this definition by suggesting that it is 
occasionally harmful to tell people the truth and to return to them what one takes. It is 
assumed that if one harms others in certain such cases one does injustice. I suggest the 
argument has the following form (A):
F  is in every case/
X is occasionally/ and occasionally not-f.
therefore, x is not F
14 Again, we do not want to say: "they are not act-types".
15 In this paper I do not discuss the difficult problem of self-predication.
161 use the phrase "a certain... " throughout this section to preserve a lack o f recognition o f the type-token 
distinction.
17 That is to say, an act-type.
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In Charmides Socrates uses a similar argument to reject Charmides' first 
definition of σωφροσύνη (B):
F  is in every case καλόν
X is occasionally καλάν and occasionally not-καλάν 
therefore, x is not F.
Just before Socrates poses the What-is-F? question in Charmides he suggests that 
σωφροσύνη is a psychic entity. He describes his alleged Thracian charm with these 
words:
The soul (ψυχή).. .my dear friend is cured by means of certain charms, and these 
charms consist of beautiful words. It is a result of such words that σωφροσύνη 
arises in the soul. And when the soul acquires and possesses σωφροσύνη it is easy 
to provide health both for the head and for the rest of the body.18
Shortly after he says:
Now it is clear that if σωφροσύνη is present in you, you are able to form an 
opinion about it. For it is necessary, I suppose, that if it resides in you, it provides 
a sense of its presence, by means of which you would form an opinion both that it 
exists and of what sort of thing it is... Well, in order to guess whether it resides in 
you or not say what in your opinion σωφροσύνη is.19
The immediate contexts of the first definition of F  in Charmides and Republic I  
differ in this respect. Socrates does not give Cephalus any indication that δικαιοσύνη is a 
psychic entity. The investigations in Republic I  and Charmides also differ in that in 
Republic I  Socrates does not initially pose a What-is-F? question. Rather, he draws 
attention to what he perceives is a definition of δικαιοσύνη in Cephalus' remarks.
It might be remarked that Socrates does not suggest that δικαιοσύνη is a psychic 
entity before the first definition of δικαιοσύνη, because the initiation of the investigation 
of F in  Republic I  differs from that in Charmides. But granting this point does not 
satisfactorily explain Socrates' silence about δικαιοσύνη being a psychic entity. 
Moreover, after the rejection of Cephalus' definition, Polemarchus offers a definition that 
introduces a series of clarifications and modifications and finally results in another 
definition, aiding one's friends and harming one's enemies. Polemarchus persists, 
throughout his exchange with Socrates, to define δικαιοσύνη as an action. At no point in 
their exchange does Socrates suggest that δικαιοσύνη is a psychic entity.
18 157a3-bl.
In contrast, in Charmides, after Socrates rejects Charmides' first definition, he
encourages Charmides to reconsider what σωφροσύνη is, and he does this in such a way
so as to suggest again that σωφροσύνη is a psychic entity.
Once again now... Charmides, concentrate hard and look inside yourself.
Consider what sort of person (όττοΐάν riva) σωφροσύνη makes (ποιεί) you, if it is 
present, and what sort of thing (ποια, τις) it would have to be in order to affect 
(iάπεργάζοιτο) you in that way.19 20
I suggest that Socrates does not suggest to Polemarchus (or to Cephalus) that 
δικαιοσύνη is a psychic entity, because Plato wants the personae to investigate the 
popular view of δικαιοσύνη as the action, aiding one's friends and harming one's 
enemies. Plato regards the rejection of this popular view as a discursive act of 
considerable importance. He does not want to complicate the discussion by suggesting 
that δικαιοσύνη is a psychic entity. Nor does he need to assert that claim in order to 
undermine the popular view. He has other means to do so. In short, to assert or argue that 
δικαιοσύνη is a psychic entity, before the popular view has been developed and 
investigated, would be premature and counter-productive.
There is also this to consider—Socrates could simply insist that σωφροσύνη is a 
psychic entity, as he does in Charmides and Laches. In the cases of temperance and 
courage—to offer particularly suggestive translations of " σωφροσύνη" and "άνδρεία"
—the prima facie plausibility of his claim might be strong enough so as not to compel a 
defense. However, in the case of δικαιοσύνη, which might strongly suggest a type of 
conduct to Plato's readers—as I believe the English word "justice" does—he might have 
to develop an argument and therefore again risk complicating the issue.21
I suggest then that the reason the treatment of the initial stage of the investigation 
in Republic /  lacks Socrates' expressed condition that F  is a psychic entity is largely 
777-specific. That is to say, it is largely due to issues specifically pertinent to 
δικαιοσύνη (as opposed to the other άρεται).
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19 158e7-159a3.
20 160d5-8.
n.iii Socrates' Criticism of Charmides' Second Definition
The progress of the investigation in Charmides seems ap<z 777-specific to a large 
extent as well. For instance, Charmides' two definitions, ήσυχιότης and αιδώς, were 
popular views of σωφροσύνη specifically associated with the conduct of aristocratic 
youths like Charmides. Critias' first definition, τό τά. εαυτού πράττε iv, had specific 
political connotations related to the quietism and anti-democratic sentiment of 
aristocratically- and oligarchicaily-minded individuals such as the historical Critias and 
his hetairoi.21 2
However, unlike Cephalus' and Polemarchus' definitions in Republic I,
Charmides' definitions and Critias' first definition are not all actions. Charmides' second
definition is a psychic entity. This may not obvious, and it may even be controversial; for,
αιδώς could be understood as modest behavior as well as a disposition to such behavior.
The following is Charmides' second definition:
Well, it seems to me.. .that σωφροσύνη makes (ποιεΐν) one feel ashamed 
(αισχύνεσθαι), that it makes23 a person modest (αισχυντηλον), and that 
σωφροσύνη is modesty (αιδώς).24
The verb "αισχύνεσθαι" suggests that σωφροσύνη causes one to have a certain 
affect, the feeling of shame. Accordingly, σωφροσύνη would be a disposition to feel 
shame. The adjective "αισχυντηλον" might mean to act modestly or to have a modest 
character (the former signifying a causal relationship, the latter a constitutive one), or 
both. The ambiguity cannot be resolved just from Charmides’ response. However, the 
way Socrates responds to Charmides' second definition lends some support to the idea 
that Charmides means to act modestly.
In the last clause of Charmides' second definition, we can rule out the meanings of
211 think "όσιότης" is rather like this as w ell, i.e., in view o f Ancient Greek religion, more suggestive o f a 
type of conduct than a psychic state of faith, devotion, or love.
22 Both claims about the socio-historical significance o f the terms are discussed in my dissertation, " Aporia 
in Plato's Charmides, Laches, and Lysis", University o f Chicago, 1997,65ff.
23 The verb for "makes" is the " ποιεΐν" from the previous clause.
24 160e3-5.
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feel ashamed and act modestly for the word "αιδώς''’, since, in view of the first clause, 
obviously neither feeling ashamed nor acting modestly can cause one to feel shame. 
Consequently, it seems we should understand αιδώς as a disposition.25
This interpretation finds some support in the fact that αιδώς would then be 
psychic, and so the second definition would accord with Socrates' insistence that 
Charmides look inside himself for the answer to the What-is-F? question. The 
interpretation is also supported by the way Socrates responds to it. Socrates gains 
Charmides' assent to the view that σώφρονβς men are άγαθοί, and that something that 
makes (άπβργάζεται) a man άγαθόν must itself be άγαθόν. Both of these claims are 
ambiguous with respect to the causal versus the constitutive relation between σωφροσύνη 
and the goodness of the man who possesses σωφροσύνη. But the line Socrates cites from 
Homer encourages the conclusion that by "a good man" Socrates means one who acts in a 
certain way:
It is not a good thing for modesty to be present to a man in need.26
The Homeric verse suggests that modesty should not hinder a person from acting 
so as to satisfy his needs;27 and that suggests that a man who possesses αιδώς does not 
act so as to satisfy his needs.
In sum, the evidence for favoring the view that Charmides defines σωφροσύνη for 
the second time as a psychic entity, as opposed to an act-type, is more equivocal than one 
wishes; but it is most reasonable to interpret him as defining a psychic entity.
Socrates uses basically the same argument to refute Charmides' second definition 
that he uses to refute Charmides' first definition. The argument has the following form 
(C):
F  is in every case άγαθόν.
X is occasionally άγαθόν and occasionally not άγαθόν
therefore, x is not F
25Translators are of little help with this passage. Lamb combines the first two clauses into one: "temperance 
makes men ashamed and bashful" (Plato XII, Harvard University Press, 1927, 33); Jowett does the same: 
"temperance makes a man ashamed or modest" (reprinted in The Collected Dialogues o f Plato, Princeton 
University Press, 1961,106)
26 161 a4.
27 It is questionable whether the context of these lines would be apparent to Charmides. Though, if  they 
would be, the context makes my point more strongly . They are spoken by Telemachus to the swineherd as 
he asks the swineherd to give bread and wine to Odysseus who is disguised as a beggar. The beggar is 
being reprimanded for not attempting to acquire food more aggressively.
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This is remarkable, because in refuting Charmides' second definition, Socrates 
does not acknowledge that this definition is, in any respect, of the right kind, that is, a 
psychic entity rather than an action. This should be contrasted with Laches' second 
definition in Laches. Once Laches identifies àvôpeia.as a psychic entity, ή καρτβρία. 
τής ψυχής, Socrates says that he has answered his question as he intended it to be 
answered.
Socrates' silence on this point in Charmides appears to disserve Charmides. 
Charmides should receive encouragement for having satisfied at least one of Socrates' 
category conditions. Instead, Socrates' refutation of Charmides' second definition seems 
to compound Charmides' puzzlement—at least as far as his comprehension of the identity 
conditions of the entity under investigation.28
This is not to say that Socrates' pedagogical effect on Charmides is entirely 
negative. Charmides at least seems excited by Socrates' dialectical ability; he asks for 
Socrates' estimation of a view of σωφροσύνη he has recently heard. However, the third 
definition, to to  ¿αυτού πράττειν, is an action; and this seems to confirm the 
supposition that Socrates' elenchoi, in particular the second one, fail to impress upon 
Charmides that σωφροσύνη is a psychic entity.
It has already been mentioned that Plato has an op6r?f-specific interest in the 
definition, το to  έαυτοϋ πράττβιν. This compels him to entertain the definition. Also, 
given the political significance of the phrase and the linguistic discussion that follows 
from its ambiguities, it is appropriately attributed to Critias, the σοφός, as opposed to 
Charmides. Furthermore, it is analyzed so as to serve as a segue to the consideration of 
σωφροσύνη as a psychic entity, specifically, an epistemic state. All this is to say, the 
placement of the third definition in the discussion, following Charmides' two definitions 
and preceding the investigation of σωφροσύνη as a certain ¿πιστήμη, is purposeful.
At the same time this suggests that in composing argument (C) in response to
28 A further related problem concerns how Socrates can expect Charmides to determine a psychic entity 
without considering the action of a σώφρωνman. In contrast, in response to Laches' first definition of 
àvôpeia, Socrates acknowledges that such aman is àvdpeîoç,and thereby gives Laches a basis from which 
to consider a related psychic entity. But Socrates rejects ήσυχιότης as an instance o f σωφροσύνη. This 
should leave Charmides questioning what action may be considered σώφρον in light of which to consider 
related psychic states.
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Charmides' second definition Plato sacrifices the integrity of the investigation, because he 
wishes to introduce Critias' first definition as it is. The second elenchos should emphasize 
that Charmides is right to define σωφροσύνη as a psychic entity, only that αιδώς is not 
the right one. But if Plato had composed an elenchos of that sort, it .would have 
jeopardized his treatment of the third definition; and it would not be reasonable for 
Critias to revert to an action.
n.iv F  as a Psychic Entity
Nowhere in the dramas of definition does Plato introduce an argument that F  
is a psychic entity. Socrates occasionally merely asserts that it is. This may be contrasted 
with the fact that Plato introduces three distinct arguments for F  being an epistemic state. 
In Charmides Plato introduces an argument that F  cannot be an action, but the argument 
suggests that F  must be a certain epistemic state, not, more broadly, a certain psychic 
entity. This argument comes in response to Critias' first definition, το τά. εαυτού 
πράττει V After initial discussion of the meaning of the phrase it is agreed that "τό τά. 
εαυτού πράττειυ" means doing good. This is a remarkable definition in that it cannot be 
refuted by elenchoi of forms (A), (B), and (C). Doing good is good, beautiful, 
and—given that σωφροσύνη is good in every case where it occurs—σώφρον. In short, 
unless he is to accept this as a satisfactory definition of σωφροσύνη Socrates must resort 
to a novel elenchos, precisely, one suggesting that σωφροσύνη is not an action. He does 
this by raising the question whether, if a man does good, but only by accident, he is 
σώφρων Critias' intuition strongly compels him to reject this possibility. He stresses that 
a man must know what he is doing in order to be σώφρων, and he goes so far as to claim 
that σωφροσύνη is self-knowledge. The argument devolving from Socrates' question may 
be expressed as follows (D):
If one is /  one knows what one is doing
If one acts well, but one does not know what one is doing, one is not f .
Therefore, if one acts well, one is not/
Securing the validity of (D) depends upon the disambiguation of the conclusion. 
The premises do not rule out the possibility that if one acts well and knows what one is 
doing, one i s /  A more acceptable conclusion would be the following: if one merely acts
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well, then one is not f  In other words, acting well is an insufficient condition for being/ 
Nevertheless, Plato uses Critias' strong response to push the investigation toward 
consideration of an intellectualist position; rather than suggest that άρετή is a 
combination of a certain epistemic state and a certain action that somehow relates to it.29
V.v Laches’ First Definition of Ά νδρεία
The initial progress of the investigation in Laches seems to have greater formal 
integrity and to depend less on the idiosyncrasies of the specific αρετή under 
investigation than the investigations in Charmides and Republic I. Socrates asks Laches 
what άνδρεία.is, and he receives the answer that a man who remains in position, fights 
against the enemy, and does not flee is άνδρείος. We may infer from (E), a man who 
stands in position, defends himself against the enemy and does not flee is άνδρείος, that 
(F), standing in position, defending oneself against the enemy and not fleeing is άνδρεία. 
This inference is encouraged by the fact that Socrates himself makes a similar type of 
inference elsewhere in the investigation: Nicias advances the view that a man is άνδρείος 
insofar as he is σοφάς', and Socrates infers that Nicias is defining άνδρεία.as a. sort of 
σοφία,30 However, if here we infer (F) from (E), we seem to run into a problem. Consider 
Socrates' response:
You speak well Laches [in claiming that the man who remains in formation, 
defends against the enemy, and does not flee is άνδρείος], but perhaps I am at 
fault here for not speaking clearly; you did not answer me as I intended you to 
when I asked, but differently.31
Socrates agrees that a man engaging in paradigmatic hoplite conduct is άνδρείος. 
That is to say, he assents to (E). If he infers (F) from (E), he needn't assent to (F);
29 Perhaps this owes to the Socratic idea that one who knows what is good cannot fail to act upon that 
knowledge.
30149d. There is a further complication with Laches' response. Laches' exact definition is: "a man who is 
willing (εθέλοι) to remain in formation,..." Strictly speaking Laches is defining a psychological state, not an 
act-type. However, I suggest that the verb έθελειν is used here rhetorically or idiomatically and that Laches 
does not intend to convey a definition of άνδρεία.ζε, a psychological state. This suggestion is confirmed by 
the fact that Socrates responds to Laches' definition with these words: "This man, I understand, is άνδρείος 
who, as you say, remains in position and fights against the enemy.1 And Laches and then Socrates respond 
as follows: "I, at any rate, think so.— Yes, and I do too." (191a).
31 το σεάποκρίνασθαι μή τούτο δ διανοούμενος ήρόμην,. άλλ' ετερον. (190e8-9)
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however, he should at least recognize Laches' answer as satisfying some category 
condition of his question. Yet, Socrates claims that Laches has answered a different 
question from the one he had asked. But if Laches has defined àuôpeia.&s paradigmatic 
hoplite conduct, then surely he has answered the question Socrates asked.
I suggest that Socrates may regard a man who engages in paradigmatic hoplite 
conduct as ανδρείος; he may intrepret Laches' response as (F); but he may still maintain 
that (F) does not answer his question—even though (F) is of the form: άνδρεία.= x.
In order to see how this may be so, we must distinguish two senses of "an άνδρεΐος 
person". A person may b e /  (1) because he has a certain psychological disposition,32 or 
(2) because he acts in a certain way. Socrates can accept (E) and reject (F), because he 
accepts (1) and rejects (2). Laches is committed to both (E) and (F), because he is 
committed to (2). In other words, Socrates recognizes àvôpeia.as characteristic of men 
who engage in paradigmatic hoplite conduct. But he does not think such men possess this 
characteristic because they engage in this type of conduct. If that were the case, it would 
not be possible to call other men άνδρείοι, though they did not engage in paradigmatic 
hoplite conduct. Yet, as Socrates proceeds to show, we do call other men ανδρείοι. 
Therefore, the men Laches describes must possess άνδρείαζαά engage in paradigmatic 
hoplite conduct, but not possess άνδρεία.because they engage in paradigmatic hoplite 
conduct.
Socrates criticizes Laches' first definition because Socrates believes άνδρεία.is 
not an action but a psychic entity. That this psychic entity causes various sorts of action, 
including the one Laches describes, Socrates would presumably admit as well. In short, 
Socrates regards Laches' failure to recognize this category condition of his question, 
being-psychic, as the reason for Laches' misjudging it.
Socrates attempts to explain why Laches' answer does not respond to his question. 
He describes numerous actors engaged in a variety of actions, whom Laches agrees are 
all άνδρεΐοί. In doing so Socrates attempts to impress on Laches that it is not because
32 This is the first o f many times I use the word "because" with reference to a passage in one o f the dramas 
of definition in order to describe relations that may be logical, causal, or constitutive. I am compelled to do 
so without attempting to clarify the nature o f the relation at the given instance, because I believe Plato 
him self is confused about the distinctions between these various types o f relations. The problem is 
discussed below in this section and in the third section.
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they engage in a certain action that these men are άνδρεΐοι. The actions are several, but
Socrates stresses that the various agents all possess some thing.
Then all these men are άνδρεΐοι, only, some possess άνδρείαν in situations of 
pleasure, some of pain, some of desire, some fear; while others possess δειλίαν in 
these same situations... What each of these things [άνδρεία.and δειλία] is, this is 
what I wanted to know.33
Laches misunderstands Socrates' question because he views ανδρεία as an action, 
rather than a psychic entity possessed by agents. Socrates' explanation attempts to shift 
Laches' focus from the character of action to die character of agency. It is important to 
recognize this, for otherwise one might mistakenly regard the failure of Laches' response 
as due to its lack of generality. This is not to say that Laches responds with a particular, 
when a universal is expected. But the failure of his response is not a result of its not being 
general enough.34 If that were the case. Laches could proceed in a subsequent definition 
to generalize the action he defines as άνδρεία. so as to encompass the numerous acts 
Socrates describes in his response. For instance, Laches could define άνδρεία.as a very 
general action such as resisting danger. However, since Socrates believes άνδρεία.is 
psychic, no description of an action would satisfactorily answer his question. 
Consideration of Socrates' response to Critias' first definition corroborates this claim. 
Consider Socrates' response to Laches:
...So then this is what I was saying just now, that I was at fault for your 
unsatisfactory answer because I was inquiring unsatisfactorily. I wanted to learn 
from you not only about άνδρείους hoplites, but cavalrymen, and soldiers in 
general; but not only άνδρείους· men in battle, also at sea and in illness and 
poverty.. .All these men are άνδρεΐοι, only some have acquired άνδρείανin 
situations of pleasure, some of pain, some of desire, and some of fear.. ,35
So try now. Laches, and tell me, what kind of power or capacity (δύναμις) 
άνδρείαν is, which is the same in situations of pleasure and pain and in all 
situations where we said it existed.. ,36
33191e4-9.
34Though at least one scholar has made precisely this claim: "His definition is, o f course, not general 
enough." (Alexander Nehamas, "Confusing Universals and Particulars in Plato's Early Dialogues", Review 
o f Metaphysics 1972, 295)
35191c7-e6.
36192b5-8.
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It is clear that being-psychic is a category condition of Socrates' question, not
only from this criticism of Laches' first definition, but also from the way Socrates
introduces the investigation of ανδρεία. Socrates says that αρετή is to be joined to the
φυχαί of Lysimachus* and Melesias' sons in order to make them better people.37
Subsequently, Laches and Socrates agree to inquire into a part, rather than the whole, of
αρετή; Socrates says:
Then, Laches, let us first try to say what άνδρεία. is; then after that we will 
investigate just how our young men may acquire it...38
Clearly then when he poses his What-is-A? question Socrates has some grounds
for assuming Laches will regard being-psychic as a category condition he needs to
satisfy, and therefore as failing to satisfy any category conditions he had in mind.
There is more to Socrates response than I have so far discussed. Laches needs
additional assistance before rendering the kind of answer Socrates is seeking. After
Socrates describes the various agents and asks Laches what they all have in common, he
asks Laches: "Do you still not grasp what I am saying?"; and Laches responds: "Not
exactly. "39 At this point Socrates offers the example of quickness:
I mean this. It is as if I were asking what quickness is, which we experience in 
running and harp-playing, in speaking and learning, and in many other activities. 
Yes, I would say we possess this (αυτά κεκτήμεθα) in almost any situation you 
care to mention—whether it be in activities involving the hands or legs or the 
mouth or voice or thought...So if someone were to ask me, "Socrates, what is this 
quickness, which you say exists in all these situations?", I would say to him that I 
call quickness the power to accomplish a lot in a short time (την εν όλίγψ 
χρόνω πολλά, διαπραττομενην δύναμιν), whether in respect of the voice or in 
running or anything else...So now. Laches, you try and tell me what power 
(δύναμις) it is that is the same in situations of pleasure and pain and everything 
else we mentioned and which is called άνδρεία,40
Vlastos contends that "δύναμις" in this passage means quality, not power or 
capacity.41 There are several reasons why his interpretation is unacceptable. By defining
37190bf.
38190d7-el.
39191ell-12.
40192al-b8.
41Gregory Vlastos, "What Did Socrates Understand by His 'What is FT Question", Platonic Studies, 
Princeton University Press, 1981,413.
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"δύναμις" as quality, Ylastos identifies quickness as a characteristic of action.42 If 
Socrates were saying this, it would undermine his previous explanation to Laches that 
άνδρεία.is not in principle a characteristic of action, but of people. We may call a certain 
action άνδρείαν, but it is so only derivatively in the following sense:/actions are f  
because they are performed by agents who possess F.
Socrates clearly states that the quickness under discussion is a possession of 
agents: "αύτο κεκτήμεθα"; and this expression is clearly intended to reflect his previous 
claim that various agents possess άνδρείαφψτήν άνδρείαν κέκτηνται")43 *Power, force, 
and capacity are the most common meanings of the word "δύναμις".44 Accordingly, we 
may infer that Socrates views άνδρεία. as a certain power of the ψυχή.
Vlastos finds this problematic because the analogy of quickness, qua δύναμις·, 
with άνδρεία makes little sense.45 The consequences are admittedly strange. However, 
Greek physical science teems with ideas that appear far-fetched in view of modem 
beliefs. Therefore, it seems anachronistic to expect that ancient thinkers held ideas about 
physical and psychological entities and processes that we regard as commonsensical.46 47In 
Republic Socrates describes the δύναμις of sight (δψις), and how the possession of this 
δύναμις· may yield various results or products {έργα). It is said that the individual's 
power of sight {δύναμις δψεως) depends upon the organ (οργανον) of the eye (δμμα), 
the color {χρήμα) or shape {σχήμα) of the visible object, as well as light {φως).41 The
42This obviously results from rendering "δύναμις" as "quality"; but Vlastos explicitly states the result: 
"Quaint though it may seem to the modem reader, 'going through much in a little time' is not a bad shot at 
what constitutes 'quickness': it would fit nicely in all contexts in which a Greek speaker would use the word 
to designate the property o f actions he wants to mark off as 'quick' from a contrasting class he reckons 
'slow'." (ibid 414; my italics)
43The expression occurs at 191e6.
^For example, in Homer it is used of bodily strength (Od. 2.62), in Herodotus o f a contingent o f soldiers in 
battle (5.100). It can also be used of the potency o f medicines (Galen, peri tes...dunameos, 1.672), or of 
magical powers (PMag.Leid. 5.8.12). Cf. Souilhé, J., Étude sur le terme Δ  YNA Μ ΙΣ dans les dialogues de 
Platon, Paris, 1919.
45"If Socrates called quickness a dunamis because he thought o f it as the power which causes a given action 
to be quick, he would be making the extraordinary assumption that the cause of everything done quickly by 
anyone anywhere is the same, e.g., that the very same thing which caused a man to run quickly would also 
cause him to learn and think quickly. Is it at all plausible that Socrates would be tempted to entertain such a 
fantastic notion which would fly in the face o f the most common experience—say, that o f a superlatively 
fast runner who is a hopeless learner and sluggish thinker?" (op. cit. 413-14)
46 Of course w e must begin with commonsense, but adjust where evidence contradicts.
47507cff; and cf. Bury, R. G., "Δύναμις and Φύσις in Plato", Classical Review 8 (1894) 298. Cf. also the 
discussion o f δύναμις in Republic. Φήσομεν δυνάμεις είναι γένος τι των δντων, αΐς δή και ημείς 
δυνάμεθα. α. δννάμεθα και άλλο πάν δ τ ί ττερ αν δύνηται,. όιον λέγω δφιν και ακοήν των
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dependence of the δύναμις of sight for its efficacy upon theses additional elements 
suggests that the δύναμις of quickness might be conceived in the same way. 
Discrepancies in the body and ψυχή of the agent, as well as other factors, might explain 
why one person who possessed quickness could run quickly, but not multiply integers so 
fast.48 If Socrates' physiological views are, from a modem perspective, far-fetched, his 
analogy of quickness and àvôpeia.is, from a modem perspective, infelicitous. But it 
seems even less satisfactory to interpret him as explaining άνδρεία, qua δύναμις, as a 
characteristic of agents, while defining quickness, qua δύναμις, as a characteristic of 
actions.49
Further support for this view comes from a passage in Protagoras where Socrates 
and Protagoras are discussing the unity of the άρεταί. Socrates gains Protagoras' assent to 
claims of the following form: people conduct themselves/-ly because of F. For instance, 
Socrates says:
Things done foolishly (άφρόνως) are done so because of foolishness (αφροσύνη);
and things done temperately (σωφρόνως) are done so because of temperance
(σωφροσύνη).50
He continues:
And if something is done with quickness (μετά, τάχους), then it is done quickly
(ταχέω ς)51
Clearly the phrase "μετά . τάχους" and the word "ταχέως" are not both being
δυνάμεων είναι,. εί äpa. μανθάνεις δ βούλομαι λέγειν το είδος... ’Άκονσον δη, δ μοι φαίνεται 
περί αυτών δυνάμεως γάρ εγώ ούτε: τινά χρόαν όρώ ούτε: σχήμα, ούτε' τι των τοιούτων, οΐον 
και άλλων πολλών,, πρός α. άποβλέπων ενια. διορίζομαι παρ' έμαυτώ τά. μεν άλλα, είναι,, τά. δέ' 
άλλα: δνναμέως δ' εις  εκείνο μόνον βλέπω,, έφ' ω τε:εστι και δ απεργάζεται, και ταντη 
έκαστήν αυτών δύναμιν έκαλεσα, και την αυτήν καλώ,, την δε: έπί έτέρω και έτερον 
άπεργαζομένην άλλην. (477cl-d5)
^Apropos o f this suggestion, Vlastos him self writes: "It has been suggested to me that good sense could 
still be made o f the idea that [Socrates] thought o f quickness as a power which enables those who have it to 
do other things quickly, by supposing that he would think of it as a power o f a higher order o f 
generality— 'quickness(H)', let us call it—which could be exercised in some actions but not in others, 
depending on what additional conditions are satisfied. This power could be imputed to a person who does 
some things quickly without entailing that he would do all things quickly. Thus both A  who runs fast and 
thinks slowly, and B who runs slowly and thinks fast, would have quickness(H)." (op. cit. 414, n.6)
49 Vlastos' claim actually runs very deep in his interpretation of Socrates' What-is-F? question as about 
meanings and is tied to his argument against the identity of the άρεταί.
50 332b4-6.
51 332b8.
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used to describe the quality of actions; for then the apodosis would be tautological.
Rather, as the preceding examples indicate, and as the preceding discussion in
Protagoras makes clear,52 entities like άφροσύνη, σωφροσύνη, and τάχος have particular
δύναμας that in distinct ways affect the actions of those that possess them.
Following Socrates' criticism of his first definition, Laches succeeds in satisfying
the condition that F is  a psychic δύναμις·.
Well then it seems to me to be καρτερία, τ ις  τής ψυχής (a certain toughness of 
the soul), if it is necessary to speak of the common element in all cases relating to 
άνδρείας (τό γε διά. πάντων περί άνδρείας πεφυκός).53
Note that in his response to Laches' definition, specifically in response
to the protasis, Socrates says:
But of course it is necessary, that is, if we are going to give each other answers 
to the questions asked (τό έρωτώμενον).54
Socrates' response indicates that Laches has now given Socrates the sort of 
response he desires.
n.vi F  as a Δύναμις
In Laches Socrates describes άνδρείας  a δύναμις. In Republic I  δικαιοσύνη is 
said to have a δύναμις. There may be more than a semantic distinction between having 
and being a δύναμις, but I will not dwell on that here. In Protagoras Socrates also 
suggests the άρεταί have δύναμεις. In Charmides Socrates never says that σωφροσύνη is 
or has a δύναμις, but he uses ¿fynam/c-language to discuss σωφροσύνη throughout the 
text.551 suggest that the dramas of A are unified on this point: άρετή is (or has) a 
δύναμις.
52 Previously Socrates asks Protagoras whether the names o f the άρεταί refer to a single entity or whether 
they refer to distinct entities that each possess a distinct δύναμις'. " Ή καί δύναμιν αννών έκαστον ¿δίαν 
εχεί;" (330a4)
53192b9-cl. τό γε: διά. πάντων περί άνδρείας πεφυκός is a difficulty phrase. By "common element" I 
mean to convey that element that naturally occurs in such situations, and by "naturally" I mean normally, 
as things go.
54192c2- 3.
55 Some of this w ill be discussed below.
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In discussing Socrates' response to Laches' second definition it was suggested 
that Socrates regards δύυαμις as a power or capacity; and specifically in the case of the 
àperai as a psychic disposition. To some extent, it has been suggested that Socrates 
regards the àperai as what we would call causally related to activity; what àperai cause 
are certain actions.56 57In Republic I  the actions that the àperai cause are described as their, 
that is, the àperaCs, "έργα". For instance, Socrates asks Thrasymachus:
Consider. Would the eyes produce their έργου well if they lacked their particular
àpenj...V1
Socrates does not say what the specific έργου and âpenj of the eyes are, but 
answers can be derived from pertinent remarks in the text. In response to Socrates' 
question, Thrasymachus assumes that the àpenj of the eyes is vision (οψις). Earlier in 
the discussion Socrates confirms with Polemarchus that it is the έργου of heat (Oeppórps) 
to make things hot, and the έργου of dryness to make things dry.58 He also confirms that 
it is the έργου of το άγαθόυ to benefit.59 These examples suggest that an έργου is an 
action. So, by analogy, it is the έργου of the eyes to see visible objects.
On the other hand, the àpenj of these entities appears to be their capacity for an 
έργου. This hypothesis is strengthened by Socrates' claim toward the end of the text that 
the ψυχή has an έργου or number of έργα, namely, to manage, rule, and deliberate;60 and 
he defines the άρετή of the ψυχή as δικαιοσύνη,61
In continuing his preceding discussion with Thrasymachus regarding the έργα, of 
àperai Socrates asks whether one city will have the δύναμις to enslave another if  it lacks 
δικαιοσύνη,62 It might be assumed that the έργον of δικαιοσύνη is understood as 
enslaving another city. But this surely cannot be a satisfactory characterization, since it 
has been denied that the έργου of δικαιοσύνη can be to harm others. It seems more
56 In this case, the relation between these δυνάμεις and their έργα.seems causal. But I am hesitant to 
describe δυνάμεις as causal agents generally. As mentioned previously, this is due to the fact that I believe 
Plato was unclear about differences between causal, constitutive, and logical relations. This point is 
developed in section three.
57 3 53b l4-cl.
58 Ου γάρ θερμότητος οΐμαι έργον ψυχειν άλλά. του εναντίου.— Ναί.— Ουδέ' δή του άγαθοΰ 
βλάτττειν άλλά. του εναντίου.— Πάνυ γε: (335d3-6)
59 Οΰδε- δή του άγαθοΰ βλάτττειν άλλά. του εναντίου.— Φαίνεται. (335d7-8)
60 353d3-6.
61 353el-9.
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accurate to say that the ipyov of δικαιοσύνη is to act cooperatively. Socrates suggests
that a city whose members lack δικαιοσύνη will be incapable of organizing a successful
militaiy campaign. This is because the ipyov of άδικία, which is understood to be present
in the absence of δικαιοσύνη, is to breed hatred among the citizens of the enslaving
city.62 3 He then speaks of αδικία.ns having a δύναμις, and suggests that if άδικία.is
present among at least some members of a group, it will disable the group from
cooperatively carrying out its enterprises.
[If, in the case of two people, άδικία is present in one,] will it lose its δύναμιν or 
retain it?—Let it have it just the same, he said.—Then is it not apparent that it has 
a certain kind of δύναμιν such that wherever it is present,64 be it in a city, family, 
army camp, or anywhere else, it first causes the thing to be incapable of acting 
within itself on account of faction and division, and then it renders the thing an 
enemy to itself?65
I conclude that in Republic I, Socrates regards ipya. as the manifestations, qua 
perceptible acts, of άρβταί, which are themselves (or have) δύναμεις.66 From this a more 
general conclusion may be drawn regarding Socrates' understanding of action in Republic 
I, Laches, Charmides, and Protagoras. An agent may possess in his ψυχή an άρβτή, 
which, insofar as it is (or has) a δύναμις, produces ("άπεργάζεσθαι" is the most common 
verb used to describe the workings of the δύναμις) an ipyov, which is a certain action. 
The αρετή itself is imperceptible, but its effects are perceptible. I will refer to this 
explanation of human action as model M.
Note also the relation between model M and the following type of claim that, as 
we saw, occurs in Protagoras: things are done/ly because of F. This claim describes 
why acts have certain characteristics; they have them because the agents who perform 
these acts possess particular δύναμεις, whose epya.these actions are. I will assume that 
the claim, things are done f -ly because of F, is equivalent to the claim,/actions are/  
because of F.
62 351M -9.
63 351d9-el.
64 The "it" refers to a<?ma.itself, not the δύναμις o f άδικία. Though this does not seem a substantial point.
65 351e6-352a3.
66 This might w ell suggest that δυνάμεις themselves in general are imperceptible. But this is separate 
problem.
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I l l B
m .i Orientation
In this section I describe the distinct formal characteristics of the investigation of 
F in  B. These include: the absence of psychic and epistemic conditions for F; the absence 
of a δύναμις condition for F; the characterization of F  as an είδος or ιδέα; and the 
characterization of F  as an ούσία.
The organization of the discussion in this section differs from that of the 
preceding section. In discussing formal characteristics of F in  A I advance through the 
dramas introducing topics that cumulatively yield a description of the distinct unity of the 
investigations discussed. But in doing this I examine problems of άρετή-specificity in 
order to reconcile the diversity of the forms of the investigation of F in  A with the unity 
of the investigations. In this section I do not make άρετή-speciñcity so central a feature 
of my interpretation. To some extent, this is because the investigations in B have a 
greater diversity of philosophical foci, and so of forms, that cannot simply be explained 
on άρετή-specific grounds. But mainly it is due to the difficulty of the philosophical 
problems the distinct formal characteristics in B raise, both per se and in relation to the 
characterization of F  in A. These problems include: the range of /  entities and the 
relationship between/ entities and F. Given propriety of length for the paper and desire 
for clarity and simplicity, I avoid discussing αρετή-specific influences on the form of the 
dramas of B. In short, instead of describing why the investigations in Euthyphro, Hippias 
Major, and Meno have distinct forms from one another while still being unified in their 
formal characteristics, I simply discuss the formal characteristics of F  they share, some of 
the philosophical problems of these characteristics, and their relation to the formal 
characteristics of F  in A.
HLii The Absence of Psychic- or Epistemic-Conditions in B
In the initial stages of the investigation in Euthyphro Socrates does not suggest 
that F is  a psychic entity (or an epistemic state). Nor does he in the initial stages of the
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investigations in Meno or Hippias Major. This occurs in Republic I  too; and I have 
suggested άρετή-specific reasons for this fact. As in Republic I, so in Euthyphro, it may 
be that some aper?7-specific or drama-specific reason explains the fact that Socrates does 
not describe το όσιον as a psychic entity early in the investigation. For instance, before 
Socrates poses the What-is-F? question the personae are preparing to evaluate allegedly 
sacrilegious activity for legal proceedings. Socrates is on trial for his conduct and 
Euthyphro is prosecuting his father for his conduct. Generally speaking, the άσεβείας 
γραφή was an accusation of sacrilegious activity, not beliefs or intentions. So, when 
Socrates asks Euthyphro what τό όσιον is, Euthyphro understands that he is being asked 
what sort of activity is appropriate with respect to the divine. This in part explains the 
kind of response Euthyphro gives to the What-is-F? question: prosecuting those who 
commit sacrilege is όσιον.
On the other hand, Socrates does not request an act. He says he wants to know 
what form acts of murder or anything else (περ'ι φόνου και περί των άλλων) have such 
that they are either όσιον or άνόσιον, and he believes that every act (πόση πράξει) that 
is όσιον has one form (μίαν ιδέαν). Moreover, after Euthyphro gives his second 
definition, το θεοφιλές, Socrates expresses enthusiasm that Euthyphro has answered his 
question as he intended it to be answered:
Very good, Euthyphro, now you have answered just as I wanted you to.67
Socrates' approval of Euthyphro's second definition may be contrasted with his 
approval of Laches' definition. Once Laches defines άνδρεία.ζζ a psychic entity, ή τής 
ψυχής καρτερία, Socrates regards him as having answered the question he asked. 
However, το θεοφιλές is not a psychic entity.
In fact, nowhere in Euthyphro does Socrates suggest that το όσιον is a psychic 
entity or an epistemic state. This is especially remarkable in view of Protagoras where 
όσιότης is discussed among the other cardinal human άρεταί. Protagoras agrees almost 
immediately that όσιότης, δικαιοσύνη, σωφροσύνη, and σοφία, are alike, if not identical; 
and the discussion proceeds to define άρετή as a kind of σοφία.
The fact that Socrates does not describe το όσιον in Euthyphro as a psychic entity 
(or epistemic state) does not imply that he disbelieves it is a psychic entity, but he does
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characterize το όσιοι/ in Euthyphro differently from the way he characterizes οσιότης in 
Protagoras and the other àperai in Protagoras and the dramas of A.
m .iii F  as an Είδος and Ιδέα.
A conspicuous distinct characteristic of the investigation in Euthyphro is Socrates' 
claim, before both Euthyphro's first and second definitions, that A is an είδος and ίδέα.6Ζ 
In A F  is nowhere described as an είδος or ιδέα. It is possible that Socrates' silence about 
το όσιοιy being a psychic entity is due to his belief that τό δσιορ is an είδος. Or rather, if 
Plato is for the first time in writing introducing the idea that F  is an είδος, possibly he is 
interested in focusing on the είδος condition, as opposed to the psychic condition. In 
Hippias Major and Meno F  is described as a είδος. In Hippias Major Socrates never 
describes to  καλόρ as a psychic entity or epistemic state. In Meno, Socrates discusses 
Meno's definition of άρετη as a desire for and a capability for procuring goods. Both the 
desire and the capability suggest a psychic entity; and although Socrates does not say that 
άρετή is something psychic, he does not reject Meno's definition because it is a psychic 
entity. Much later in Meno Socrates and Meno discuss definitions of άρετή as wisdom.
So, the treatment of άρετή in Meno encourages the hypothesis that being an είδος and 
being psychic need not be exclusive conditions.
m .iv F  and the Range of/Entities
In Hippias Major just before Socrates poses the What-is-F? question, he elicits 
Hippias' assent to four claims:
(1) δίκαιοι men are δίκαιοι because of δικαιοσύρχ)* 689
(2) σοφοί men are σοφοί because of σοφία70
(3) all άγαθά.things are άγαθά.because of τφ  άγαθφ71
(4) all /ruAà.things are καλά, because of τφ καλφ72
677a2-3.
681 understand these words as synonymous.
69 287c2.
70 287c5.
71287c5-6.
72 287c8-9.
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These claims exhibit a distinction in range between/entities. In (1) and (2) the/  
entities are humans. Given the psychic condition for the identity of αρετή, it could be that 
the/ entities are limited to those with ψυχαί. Socrates could, and often does in A, focus 
discussion on the goodness and beauty (or fineness) of humans, such that goodness and 
beauty could be viewed as psychic characteristics of humans. But as (3) and (4) stand, the 
range of/  entities is broader. This broader range may be emphasized by the adjective 
"πάντα", which appears in both (3) and (4), and which could appear in (1) and (2), but 
doesn't.
The claim that in Hippias Major Socrates is seeking the beauty because of which
all beautiful things are beautiftd, not just human-beings (or their actions), is supported by
the following remark of his, which occurs later in the investigation:
Are you not able to recall that I was asking what το καλόν is, by which to 
whatever it is added it befalls that thing to be καλόν, whether it is a stone or a 
stick or a human or a god or any act or any study?73
In contrast, the only reason it seems Socrates limits the discussion to human 
dperai in A is Plato's interest in human άρεταί, as opposed to any other kind of άρετή. 
But given the meaning of the term, the investigation could be much broader.74
In Euthyphro Socrates says he is interested in that single Form because of which 
all άσιa.entities are όσια. I will refer to this as:
(5) all όσια.are όσια.because of τφ όσιω.
(5) has the same form as (3) and (4) from Hippias Major. This encourages 
consideration of how broad a range of όσια, entities he has in mind. Given the discussion 
of όσιότης in Protagoras it might be assumed that the range of όσιa.entities in 
Euthyphro is limited to humans and their actions. I am reluctant to allow the treatment of 
όσιότης in Protagoras to influence the interpretation of το όσιον in Euthyphro. But, on 
the other hand, in Meno όσιότης is enumerated among the cardinal άρεταί, as it is in 
Protagoras,75 This paper's hypothesis of characteristic affinities between Meno and 
Euthyphro might lend support to the claim of a broader characteristic unity about this 
particular aspect of όσιότης'. in all dramas of definition Plato regards όσιότης as a
73 292c9-d3.
74 See footnote 1.
7578d7-el.
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characteristic primarily of humans and derivatively of their actions. If that were so, then
the similarity of form between (5) and (3) and (4) would be misleading, as far as judging
the range of δσια. entities.
In considering the breadth of range in (5) it is useful to consider Socrates'
response to Euthyphro's second definition. Euthyphro defines το δσιον for the second
time with the following words: τό θεοφιλές- is δσιον. It is questionable exactly how to
interpret this statement as a definition of the Form τό οσιον. But, without broaching that
problem here, we can work from the idea that that which is god-beloved is οσιον. The
problem lies in defining the conceived range of god-beloved entities. Euthyphro initially
defines τό οσιον as an action. So the question is whether Euthyphro is defining that
which is god-beloved more restrictedly as action that is god-beloved, or whether he is
defining it more broadly as whatever is god-beloved. Socrates confirms that, at least for
him, the discussion and the definition encompass more than just holy action:
So then, let us consider what we are saying. Both that which is loved by the gods 
(to θεοφιλές) and the person who is loved by the loved (ό θεοφιλές άνθρωπος) 
is holy (δσιος)76
Clearly Socrates is thinking about people as well as actions. But it is still unclear 
whether to θεοφιλές is conceived as encompassing inanimate objects as well as actions. 
Again, what speaks most in favor of interpreting to  θεοφιλές as all-encompassing is 
Socrates' insistence that Euthyphro define the Form common to all holy things {πάντα. 
r à  όσια). However, to argue on that basis would be circular.
Insight into this question can be gained by considering the use of the adjective 
"δσιον" among the Attic orators, dramatists, and prose authors. The overwhelming 
majority of uses of the adjective "οσιον" modify the names of actions and people. 
Occasionally, laws are described as όσια, but presumably that is because they prescribe 
οσιον action.77 On the few occasions that inanimate objects are described as οσιον this 
seems clearly connected with their relation to οσιον activity; for instance, hands are όσια. 
(because not defiled by άνόσιον activity) and homes are όσια.(because occupied by δσιοι 
people) 78 In Aristophanes' Lysistrata a pregnant woman on the Acropolis prays that she
767a8.
77 Thuc. 2.52.3; Ant. 5.14,6.2.
78 Soph. Oed. Col. 470; Aesch. Ag. 778.
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will not go into labor until she comes to a qclovχωρίον (place). The scholiast explains 
that it would have been sacrilegious to give birth on the Acropolis. So, a δσιον place is 
one appropriate for a certain kind of activity.
The evidence seems to suggest that, despite the similarity of (5) with (3) and (4), 
Euthyphro and Socrates conceive the range of όσια,entities as including only people and 
their actions.
ΠΙ.ν The Relation of F  and/Entities
I have spent some time analyzing the range of/  entities in preparation for the 
analysis of the relation between F  and/entities. In considering the dramas of A two kinds 
of claims regarding the relation of F  and/ entities occur. The following claim is derived 
from Socrates' model of action M:
(G) /actions are/because of F
In Charmides' second definition, we also encounter the following type of claim:
(H) /people are /because of F
I describe the relation in (G) as dynamic, noting that F  is a δνναμις and 
that / action (or action done/ly) is the έργον of F. This kind of dynamic relation may be 
causal. In the preceding section I spoke of it as causal. However, I do not want to assert 
that all relations Socrates describes as dynamic are causal. The reason is, as we will see in 
this subsection, Plato does not seem to appreciate certain differences between logical, 
constitutive, and causal relations.
In considering the relation in (H) the following complications arise. The phrase, 
"an/ person", is ambiguous. It can mean either a person who has F, qua psychological 
disposition; or a person who acts/ ly. In Charmides' second definition I interpreted the 
phrase "an/person" as a person who acts f-ly. According to this interpretation, there is no 
substantial difference between (G) and (H), and in both cases the relationship of F  to the/  
entity is dynamic.
But, there are other descriptions of/people in A that do not seem to allow this 
interpretation. For instance, in Charmides Critias regards as σώφρων that man who has a 
certain kind of knowledge. In such cases, the relation of the/person and F  seems to be
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constitutive. Consider also, and more broadly, that if άρετή is a kind of σοφία, a man 
who has σοφία.must be σοφός. Consequently, we might conclude that, although in (G) 
the relation between/actions and F  is dynamic, in (H) the relation between/ people and 
F  is not dynamic, but constitutive. However, I am reluctant to use the word "constitutive" 
as well. This is both because there is no analysis of the relation between F  and/ people in 
A, and because I do not regard the nature of the relation of constitution as simple or 
unambiguous.79 If F is  a part (μέρος) of a person—in some vague sense of part—all we 
can say is that a person is / i f  that person has F  in his ψυχή. For want of a better 
expression, I refer to this as a psychic relation.
We see now that/actions are/for a different reason than/ people are/  In view of 
this, cases such as (3) and (4) become troublesome and success in determining the scope 
of όσια, entities in Euthyphro assumes a particular importance. In (3), (4), and (5), all 
entities, including actions, people, and any other/thing, are described as /because of F. 
This seems to suggest that F  relates to all/things in the same way. But if this is so, how 
can it be reconciled with the fact that/people and/ actions are not related to F in  the 
same way?
I note and discuss three possible options here without resolving the issue. In the 
following subsection I introduce a further distinct characteristic of F in  B, ουσία, which 
introduces further complications into the problem at hand. The options are these. One is 
to claim that what we might consider a constitutive relation Socrates views as dynamic.
In other words, Socrates views the dynamic relation much more broadly than we do.
A passage in Charmides suggests that Socrates understands δύναμις very broadly. 
Critias proposes a definition of σωφροσύνη as the knowledge of knowledge and lack of 
knowledge. Socrates doubts whether such a thing is possible; and he argues by analogy 
that it is unlikely to exist. He claims:
Whatever has the capacity to effect (δύναμις) an object which is itself will not
have the nature (ούσία) on which its effect can work.80
For instance, in the case of vision, a vision of vision is only possible if the object 
of vision, in this case vision, is of such a nature that it can be viewed, i.e., has
79 Particularly since we are dealing with properties here.
80 168dl-3.
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characteristics such as form and color. The range of examples introduced to strengthen 
Socrates' claim reveals how broadly he understands δύναμις. In addition to modes of 
perception and other intentional states, such as fearing, loving, and opining, he refers to 
relations and relational quantities, such as exceeding (μεΐζον) and double (διπλάσιοι). 
For instance, in the case of double-ness, that which is double does not have the ουσία. 
upon which its δύναμις can achieve its effect, for then it would be double itself and half 
itself. Similarly, in the case of exceeding-ness, that which exceeds does not have the 
ούσια.νφοη which its δύναμις can achieve its effect, for then it would exceed itself and 
be less than itself.
In these cases Socrates seems to regard relations that we might consider logical or 
constitutive as dynamic.S1 This might suggest that he regards the relation of F  and/  
people as dynamic as well; and in that case there would be no disunity between earlier 
and later dramas on this point. The main difficulty with this solution is that nowhere is an 
/ person's or f  entity's simply being/described as the εργον of the δύναμις. Unless we 
assume it is, we cannot speak of the relation as dynamic.
A second option is to claim that in A Socrates views the relation between/ actions 
and F  and /  people and F  as different, and in A he never says all/things are /because of 
F. So, Socrates does not contradict himself, in A. On the other hand, since he does use 
such phrases as (3), (4), and (5) in B, his characterization of the relation between /entities 
and F  in B is different from and disunified with his characterization of this relation in A.
In contrast to the first option, this second one with claims disunity between A and 
B favors a developmental!st interpretation. In this regard one developm ental 
interpretation might run as follows. When Plato first started thinking and writing about F, 
it was qua αρετή, specifically qua psychic δύναμις. He thought of the relation of άρεταί 
to certain/ entities, namely, actions, dynamically. When he broadened his consideration 
of F  to include non-psychic entities and began to conceptualize F  as a Form, the 
conceptualization of the dynamic relation became difficult to maintain, either because of 
his reluctance to conceive of all Forms as δύναμεις, or of all/entities, q u a f as the έργα. 
of those δύναμεις.
81 Note that the term "epyov" does not appear in this discussion.
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Finally, a third option, like the first, preserves unity by reinterpreting phrases such 
as (3), (4), and (5). For instance, in Euthyphro it is said that all/ entities are/because of 
F. The range of/  entities includes at least people and actions. Perhaps both people and 
actions are/because of F, but the relations between/ actions and F  and/people and F  
are not the same. The instrumental dative, by which the relation of /  entities and F  is 
expressed, describes a relation vaguely. Therefore, phrases such as (5) may indicate 
simply that anything/must be related to F  in some way; but it does not indicate that 
every / entity is related to F  in the same way. /people and/ actions are both related to F  
in some way, but the former may be related psychically, while the latter is related 
dynamically. Furthermore, as in the case of Hippias Major, those / entities that are neither 
actions nor people may be related to F  in yet some other way. Of course it is inadequate 
to say that an/entity is related to F  in some way; since all entities are related to F  is some 
way.
n i.v i F  as an Ούσία.
In continuing to examine the relation of F  and/entities, in this subsection I 
consider one further distinctive formal characteristic of the investigations in B. In B, F is  
described as an ουσία. The word "ουσία" occurs in Charmides and Protagoras, as well as 
in the texts of B; however, only in Euthyphro and Meno is the pursuit of the identity of F  
described as the pursuit of an ουσία}2 The passages in Euthyphro and Hippias Major in 
which the word "ουσία" occurs are particularly complex; and it would be inappropriate to 
examine them here. In contrast, the passage from Meno is relatively uncomplicated and 
provides evidence needed to make my point. My point is that the relation between F, qua 
ούσία, and /  entities cannot be identical to the dynamic or psychic relation, at least insofar 
as the latter two have been described above.
In Meno, Socrates discusses the ούσία of bees. The ούσία. of bees is understood as 
that entity because of which all bees are bees.
...Now, Meno,...if I were asking about the ούσία. of the bee, what it is; and you
said that there are many and various ones, what would you say if I asked you this:
82 Charm. 168d2; Meno 72bl ; Hip. Maj. 301b6, 8 ,301e4,302c5; Prot. 349b4.
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Do you agree that there are many and various bees and that they differ from one 
another insofar as they are bees? Or do they not differ in this regard, but in some 
other respect, such as in their beauty, or size, or something else of that sort?83
In this example it does not seem reasonable to interpret the relation between the 
ουσία, of bees and the bees themselves as psychic, because it does not seem reasonable to 
think that what makes all bees bees is something present in the φυχαί of bees. It also does 
not seem reasonable to interpret the relation as dynamic, insofar as we consider the 
dynamic relation as causal. The ούσία. of bees does not cause bees to be bees. On the 
other hand, we have seen in the Charmides passage of the preceding subsection that 
Socrates may interpret the dynamic relation more broadly or differently than the causal 
relation. Even if this is so, the ούσία. of bees is not described here as a δύναμις and the 
bees are not described as έργα, oí that ούσία. Furthermore, nowhere in Euthyphro or 
Hippias Major is F, qua ούσία, described as a δύναμις, or/ entities as έργα.of F, qua 
ούσία.
Consequently, I will describe the relation between F, qua ούσία, and/entities as 
ousiac. This is of course merely a label for a relation whose nature is as yet 
undetermined. But, as a provisional device, it does not seem to me unwarranted. The 
suggestion that the relation between F  and/ entities is to be described as ousiac means 
that/ entities are/because they stand in some, as yet undefined relation to an ούσία-F. 
Whether distinct/ entities are/because they stand in various types of relation to a single 
ούσία.F  is unclear. Since the word "ούσία" does not occur in A as a condition for the 
identity of F, the characterization of the relation between F  and/ entities in A and B 
appears distinct. But the possibility that distinct/entities stand in various relations to the 
ούσία F  accommodates an interpretation of distinction, rather than disunity on this point 
between A and B. In other words, the ousiac relation may be a relation-type 
superordinate to others such as dynamic and psychic relations, in addition to still others.
Finally, I want to say that this seems to me a very charitable interpretation of the 
relation of F  and/ entities. We have only begun to question whether Plato really 
appreciates the difference between logical, causal, and constitutive relations. I believe 
that an examination of the Euthyphro passage in which "ούσία” occurs would reveal that
8372bl-6.
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he does not. If we could conclude that this was the case, it would help clarify our present 
question at least by showing that Plato himself may not have had a sound understanding 
of the relation between F  and/ entities.
IILvii Conclusion
In conclusion, in this paper I have suggested that Socrates investigates the identity 
of F  by attributing one set of characteristics to F  in one subset of the dramas of definition
(A) and another set of characteristics to F in  another subset of the dramas of definition
(B) . In A F is  characterized as psychic, epistemic, and a δύναμις. In A two types of 
entities are described as /  people and actions. The relationship of F  to people differs from 
the relationship of F  to actions. In the first case the relationship appears to be 
constitutive. I have preferred to describe it as psychic. That is to say, F  exists in the ψνχή 
of individual people. Whether there are multiple Fs, one for each person, like tropes, or 
whether F  is single, like a universal, is indeterminate. The question is simply not raised in 
A. In the latter case the relationship appears to be causal. I have preferred to describe it as 
dynamic. That is to say,/action is the epyov of F, where F  is a δύναμις. In this case F  is 
apparently a psychic capacity or disposition. In Short, F  is related to/ people and/action 
differently.
In two texts of B, Euthyphro and Hippias Major, F  is never explicitly 
characterized as psychic, epistemic, or dynamic. Instead F  is characterized as a single 
Form (είδος/ιδέα) possessed by all /  entities. In this sense the characterization of F in  A 
and B differs, but again this does not imply inconsistency. For instance, in Meno F is  
considered to be a psychic entity. Furthermore, since it is unclear in A whether F is  a 
unity or plurality, the characterization of F in  B as a Form is distinct from, but not 
necessarily inconsistent with the characterization of F in  A.
In Hippias Major, though not in Euthyphro, the range of/entities is broader than 
people and actions. It includes inanimate and animate non-human natural kinds as well as 
artifacts. In these cases F is neither in the ψυχαί of the/entity, nor are/entities described 
as έργα, of F, qua δύναμις. The nature of the relationship between F  and this broader 
range of/  entities is treated to a limited extent. In particular, in B F is  characterized as an
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ούσία. In HippiasMajor and Euthyphro the phrase-type appears:/entities are/because 
of F. Accordingly, I refer to the relation here as ousiac. Given F s characterization as an 
ουσία, consistency between A and B regarding the relation between F  and/entities can 
be preserved only if  the ousiac relation is understood as of a superordinate type to the 
types of psychic, dynamic, and other indeterminate relations.84
Lastly, in arguing for the distinct characterizations of F in  A and B I have avoided 
describing A and B in terms of priority and posteriority, whether that be of a 
chronological or pedagogical kind. According to the current dominant developmentalist 
paradigm at least two of the texts of B, Meno and Hippias Major, are regarded as 
chronologically posterior to those of A. To my knowledge no developmentalists have 
argued that Euthyphro succeeds Republic I, Laches, and Charmides. Moreover, to my 
knowledge none have argued for the division between A and B I have described. As for 
developmentalists, to my knowledge none have argued that the texts of B succeed those 
of A.85 Besides Kahn, in fact none have recently attempted to order the dramas of 
definition at all.
84 It may also be noted that the problem o f the relation between Forms and non-Forms is notoriously 
problematic. So, the fact that it is found problematic here at least suggests why this may be so in other 
Platonic writings.
85 In Plato and the Socratic Dialogue Charles Kahn argues that Laches, Euthyphro, Meno "form a unified, 
continuous exposition on the logic of definition." (Cambridge University Press, 1996,149) Kahn denies the 
authenticity of Hippias Major.
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Appendix F  and the To·/Phrase
For most of the discussion in Euthyphro and Hippias Major Socrates refers to F  
using a phrase compounded of the neuter singular definite article and an attributive neuter 
adjective, το-f. In this appendix I refer to this phrase-type simply as the τό-phrase. The 
τό-phrase does not occur in Meno and it does occur in Republic /; so, it cannot be argued 
that a complete shift occurs. However, the use of the τό-phrase in Euthyphro is 
particularly remarkable, because in Protagoras the word "όσώτης" is used exclusively. I 
suggest that Plato introduces the τό-phrase in Euthyphro in conjunction with the other 
formal characteristic distinctions of B to distinguish his novel conceptualization, the 
Form.
Τό-phrases in the Platonic corpus are commonly understood to operate as singular 
terms designating the Forms of Platonic metaphysics. The Platonic use of rô-phrases is 
idiosyncratic insofar as Plato's theory of Forms is idiosyncratic. But the formation of 
singular terms by compounding the definite neuter article and adjective is common 
enough among Greek writers . We might think to refer to this use of the τό-phrase as 
property-designating. However, that would be anachronistic. It would assume that what 
Plato understood by a Form is what we understand by a property. This is dubious both 
because debate persists over how Plato understood the Forms and whether the treatment 
of Forms throughout the corpus is consistent; as well as because there is no widely 
accepted contemporary view of the metaphysics of properties. Consequently, it seems 
most prudent to refer to this use of the τό-phrase as Form-designating (and instances as 
Form-designations); where a Form is understood merely and vaguely as a sui generis 
ontological kind.
There are in fact several additional uses of the τό-phrase; but the following ones, 
which I will call quantificational or quantifier-phrases, warrant our special attention. 7 ’0- 
phrases are used as quantifiers where the universe of discourse is defined by the set of f  
entities. Which quantifier depends on the given sentence. For instance, " το καλόν εσ τιν  
άγαθόν" may be expressed as the schema Vx (Kx z> Ax) and translated as "Everything 
that is beautiful is good"; while "τό άνδρειον πράττει" may be expressed as the schema
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3x (Αχ . Px) and translated as "He is doing something courageous".86 In both such cases, 
we can translate the rô-phrase as "that which is" or "what is" followed by the adjective, 
and thereby preserve the indeterminacy of the quantification. Accordingly, the preceding 
Greek sentences may be rendered as "That which is beautiful is good" and "He is doing 
what is courageous".
The investigation of F  in Euthyphro is distinct from those in A, except, to some 
extent, Republic I, in that the grammatical form of F  is distinct from the common 
feminine nouns ending in -eCa, -της·, or -σύυη that appear in the four other texts. In 
Euthyphro Socrates uses a rô-phrase (" τό όσιοι/'). But in Protagoras, where όσιότης is 
discussed among the five cardinal human áperaí, Socrates uses the conventional form 
"όσιότης" and never the phrase "το όσιοι/'. In what are commonly referred to as middle 
and late writings Plato uses the rô-phrase as a Form-designation. Grammatical 
distinctiveness in Euthyphro alone obviously does not compel us to interpret a 
transformation in the development of Plato's metaphysics; nevertheless, it is a question 
why Plato uses the rô-phrase for F in  Euthyphro and not in Protagoras.
I suggest Plato's introduction of the rô-phrase, or rather his adaptation and 
application of the rô-phrase may conform with the transformation between A and B I 
have been describing in this paper. As he makes Socrates characterize F as an είδος and 
an ουσία, he wishes to distinguish this characterization terminologically. So, in B, as in 
the so-called middle and late writings, Plato refers to the ίδέαι and είδη using a distinct 
locution.
In both Euthyphro and Hippias Major Socrates uses the words "όσιότης" and 
"κάλλος" for F  as well. Though he does so only in the later stages of the investigations. 
The reasons for this are too complex to discuss here. But, it is important to recognize that 
he regards "όσιότης" and "τό όσιου" as well as "το καλοί/' and "κάλλος"—where the 
rô-phrases are understood as Form-designations—as referring to the same two entities 
respectively. However, he also seems to recognize that the use of the common words as
86 This sentence is less easily rendered in quantificational notation than the preceding one. The reason 
seems to be that, while grammatically "the courageous" is the object o f the verb, ontologically, the 
grammatical object and the verb do not refer to two distinct entities. Rather, "the courageous" describes the 
kind o f act performed. Philologists use the phrase "internal accusative" in such cases. Despite the 
infelicities o f the example, I expect the point is clear.
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opposed to the rô-phrases provoke different thoughts in the audience, both the intended 
reading audience of the texts and Socrates' interlocutors.
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Aristotle on the Philosophical and the Political Life
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Aristotle's conception of eudaimonia, usually translated as 
happiness, sometimes as human flourishing, has generated an
enormous amount of literature and continues to do so. Writers on
eudaimonia have usually limited their efforts to the Nicomachean 
Ethics and have often ignored the political doctrines in that work. 
Both the /V.E1 and the Politics deal with a pursuit called politike, 
politics. Both deal with "the philosophy of human affairs". In both 
the N.E. and the Politics Aristotle is concerned not just with the
eudaimonia of the individual (man),2 but also with the eudaimonia of
the larger community (polis) in which the individual lives.
In this paper I should like to present my reading of one aspect 
of Aristotle’s theory of eudaimonia: what is the role that 
contemplation and morally virtuous behavior or, as I prefer to call 
it, character-excellent behavior, play in the happy life? In Book X 
Aristotle calls both these two activities happiness, wi th  
contemplation being primary happiness and character-excellent 
behavior secondary happiness. This question is usually phrased in a
1 Chapters 1-3 of book I clearly indicate that what Aristotle is doing in Λ/.Ε is political 
science, as he calls it. One can look at the relation between the N.E. and the Politics in 
the following way: the N.E. is in the first place concerned with establishing what is good 
for the individual making abstraction in some important respects of his natural 
community, the polis. The Politics will then look at ways how to legislate in such a way 
that the good of the individual and of the polis is achieved or, at least, strived after. The 
Politics 'completes' the philosophy of human affairs (cf. N.E. X9 1181b12-15, where 
the transition is made from the N.E. to the Politics).
2 Aristotle is in the first place interested in the eudaimonia of men, and not just of all 
men, only to a lesser degree in the eudaimonia of women, who will in any case not qualify 
as candidates for the life of the highest eudaimonia.
